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Your Biobank, Your Doctor? 
The right to full disclosure of population biobank findings 
J. A. BOVENBERG, T. MEULENKAMP, E.M. SMETS AND J.K.M. 
GEVERS1  
 
"To wrest from nature the secrets which have perplexed 
philosophers in all ages, to track to their sources the causes of 
disease, to correlate the vast stores of knowledge, that they are 
quickly available for the prevention and cure of disease -- these are 
our ambitions." - Sir William Osler, 1906 
Abstract 
The advent of personal genom ics companies o ffering direct transla tion of  scientif ic 
data into personal health information, calls into question traditional policies to refuse 
disclosure of such scientif ic data to resea rch participants. This seems especially true 
for population biobanks, as they collect not only genotype in formation but also 
associated phenotype infor mation, and thus may be in a unique position to translate 
their scien tific f indings into perso nal h ealth inf ormation f or their participan ts. 
Disclosure of such inform ation seem s mandated by the expectations raised by 
biobanks (‘to help bring about the era of personalized m edicine’) and their 
participants’ rights to know health information, to know c linical research results, to 
life and health and particular ly th eir right to  benef it. R efusals to disclos e suc h 
information can be grounded in the lack of  analytical validity and/or clinical utility of 
most findings, the need to avoid the ther apeutic misconception, the complexity and 
costs involved in translation and disclosure  and the disproportio nate burden resulting 
from the obliga tion to r espect participants’ right not to know before any disclosure  
can be m ade. Currently, any dem ands by part icipants in population biobanks for full 
disclosure of all pertine nt personal health  information potentia lly resu lting f rom the 
biobank’s scientific findings are unlikely to  be granted by a Dutch court under Dutch 
and international law. As the law stands now, a population biobank is neither a doctor  
nor a personal genom ics company. However, in  view of the  rapid scientific, m edical, 
technological, comm ercial and social developments, population biobanks m ust 
prepare to take more care of their participants’ legitimate interest in receiving as much 
validated personal health inform ation as re asonably possible, in a tim ely fashion, by 
developing appropriate transl ation and disclosure m echanisms. This paper exam ines 
whether population biobank participants ha ve the right, under Dutch civil law and 
international law, to f ull disclosure, i.e. to all in formation genera ted by the biobank  
that is per tinent to their presen t a nd f uture health. It pioneers the for mat of a  
hypothetical court case to elucidate the lega l and policy argum ents” for and against 
full disclosure. 
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If you provide your DNA to deCodeme, you will be provided, within 2- 4 weeks, with 
information on your genetic risk for a series of diseases, based on the relation of your 
genetic scan measurements to relevant scientific literature regarding genetic risks. If 
you provide your DNA to a population biobank, you will not be provided with any 
information, genetic or otherwise. True, a population biobank is not a commercial 
personal genomics company and the utility of “direct-to-consumer” susceptibility 
testing has been questioned. Nevertheless, the ability of companies like deCodeme to 
translate scientific findings into personal health information for their customers, in a 
matter of weeks, does raise the question why population biobanks decline any 
translation of their findings into personal health information for their participants. The 
question is even more pertinent given that a population biobank has all the data 
necessary for a proper translation that commercial providers have not: the phenotype 
measurements, the medical record, the family history and the life-style data of the 
individual participant, all regularly updated and accessible in standardized format.  
 
The rationale for non-disclosure is that most research findings are aggregate findings 
of an exploratory nature, lacking analytical validity or clinical utility for the 
individual concerned. However, both the nature of population biobank studies and 
recent developments in technology, medicine and ethics seem to provide support for 
calls for more or even full disclosure to individual participants. In addition, 
international legal instruments increasingly recognize a right to feedback of research 
results in general. It has been argued, convincingly, that under common law a biobank 
might owe its participants a legal duty to feed back in the, admittedly rare, situation 
where biobank research reveals that an individual is at imminent risk of a serious yet 
treatable condition.2 That argument, however, begs some questions. What, exactly, is 
a ‘serious condition’? What, exactly, is ‘treatable’? And, more fundamentally, why 
should such a duty be limited to imminent risks, to serious conditions and conditions 
that are treatable?  
This paper examines whether population biobank participants have the right, under 
Dutch civil law and international law, to full disclosure, i.e. to all information 
generated by the biobank that is pertinent to their present and future health. It pioneers 
the format of a hypothetical court case to elucidate the legal and policy arguments pro 
and con full disclosure and to illustrate how a Dutch civil law court might arrive at its 
verdict. While fictitious, the case draws on a number of existing population biobank 
studies. The presentation of the facts of the case will be followed by the briefs of both 
parties, the considerations of the hypothetical court and the verdict.   
Case study 
The invitation. A healthy 45-year-old woman (X) receives an invitation letter from her 
family doctor (GP) to participate in a major study called the “Biobank”. Her GP 
explains to X that the study aims ‘to track to their sources the causes’ of common 
complex disorders, such as diabetes, cancer and Alzheimer’s. These disorders are 
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thought to be caused by a large number of small, often additive effects, representing 
the outcome of the interplay, at various levels, of genes, lifestyle and the 
environment.3,4,5,6 To reveal these complex interactions, the Biobank will collect and
study genetic, clinical, biological, and molecular information and corresponding blood 
and urine samples from 150,000 participants (patients and healthy persons) and their 
family members for 30 years. The samples and data collection will be a resource for 
multiple researchers to ‘correlate the vast stores of knowledge’ for multiple studies of 
a host of common complex disorders. Eventually, the researchers hope to find out 
what determines the effect of a universal risk factor for a given disorder in a particular 
individual, such as X.  
 
 
Joining the biobank. X decides to join the study. At an appointment at the assessment 
centre, a nurse practitioner measures her height, weight, BMI, pulmonary function, 
bone density and blood pressure. A specially trained staff member collects three 
tablespoons of her blood for future DNA-analysis and she provides a urine sample. 
She fills in a questionnaire, answering detailed questions about her education, 
employment, physical activity, nutrition habits, general health condition, smoking and 
alcohol consumption, hospitalisations, diseases suffered, medicaments used, hormonal 
contraceptive preparations and menopause medicaments, and pregnancies. There are 
also questions about her nationality and native language, as well as detailed questions 
relating to her parents, grandparents and great-grandparents. X signs a consent form 
allowing the Biobank to re-contact her and to follow her health for the term of her 
participation, directly through her medical record and through other records that may 
be related to her health (e.g. occupational or residential information). She goes home 
with a print-out of her measurements. Every other year, she shows up at the 
appointment centre to provide fresh samples and updates to the questionnaires. 
 
Demanding disclosure. Halfway into the study, X develops diabetes and suffers a 
heart attack. As cardiovascular diseases run in the family she is fearful of an imminent 
stroke. Her daughter has just been recruited into the study and was informed that both 
her cholesterol level and her blood pressure were abnormally high. Fearing that this 
may all be related and ‘genetic’, X contacts the Biobank. For some years now, the 
Biobank’s newsletters have alerted her to a series of scientific publications pertaining 
to these disorders, all based on research on the Biobank. She reminds the Biobank of 
its stated ambition that research findings should be ‘quickly available for the 
prevention and cure of disease’. Arguing that the Biobank is in a perfect position to 
translate its findings to her individual situation, she demands disclosure of all genetic 
and non-genetic risk information pertaining to her present and future health, 
regardless of whether the risks indicated by the findings are imminently life-
threatening, high, moderate or low risk, regardless of whether the findings concern a 
condition that is treatable, actionable, have reproductive importance or are merely 
recreational, and regardless of whether the findings relate to conditions that are late or 
early onset. 
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The lawsuit. The Biobank denies her request, referring to the Participant Information 
Brochure, which reads as follows:  
 
Participants will NOT be provided with information (genetic or 
otherwise) about their own individual results or incidental findings 
derived from or made in the course of examination of the database 
or samples by research undertaken after enrolment. 
 
X initiates legal proceedings, challenging the Biobank’s non-disclosure policy. She 
posts her complaint on the Biobank webforum, which in no time is filled with 
expressions of support from thousands of other participants, who are willing to join 
the lawsuit. 
 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
  2008  2009, Vol.5, No.1, pp.55-79 
 
 
_____________       
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.1 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 




The Tuskegee Experiment. In 1932 the US Public Health Service (PHS), with the 
approval of Tuskegee Institute and the local health department, initiated in Macon 
County, Alabama, an observational study to determine the natural course of untreated, 
latent syphilis in black males.7 The study comprised 410 Negro men with untreated 
syphilis and a comparable group of 201 uninfected Negro men.8 The syphilites were 
recruited under the impression that they were being treated for their ‘bad blood’, a 
local idiom that encompassed syphilis as well as some anemias.9 They were enticed 
with offers of free medical examinations and special free treatments.10 Although data 
from the Study were reported in medical journals, neither the general public nor, with 
the exception of a few local doctors and administrators and officials of the Tuskegee 
Institute, the public in Macon County had any knowledge of the study until it was 
exposed by the Associated Press in 1972.11,12 After a 1973 government report 
concluded that the study, in retrospect, was ethically unjustified and that penicillin 
should have been made available to the participants in the study not later than 1953, 
the study was halted.13 
The lawsuit. Surviving participants filed a lawsuit against the US federal government, 
Casper Weinberger as Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
the Public Health Service, the State of Alabama, the Milbank Fund and a number of 
individuals connected with the study, seeking $1.8 billion in damages for the 
surviving participants and the heirs of those who had died (Pollard v. United States of 
America). 14  Alleging that the Public Health officials purposely did not inform the 
participants when they were found to have syphilis, that they intentionally withheld 
this information from participants, that the participants were never advised that any of 
them had syphilis, and were never treated for syphilis, the participants’ attorney 
claimed that the government had violated their civil rights guaranteed under the Fifth, 
Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States and Article I, section VI of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.15 
X’s Brief 
Theory of X’s case 
Legal arguments. To support her claims, X advances a variety of legal arguments 
under Dutch civil law and international law.  First, she invokes the terms of her 
participation in the Biobank which are set forth in the consent form (A. Contract). 
Second, she maintains that the Biobank’s non-disclosure policy has become obsolete, 
in view of scientific, technological and societal developments (B. Invalidity of Non-
Disclosure). Third, she invokes a number of statutory, constitutional and international 
human rights and professional norms to support her action for negligence (C. 
Negligence).  
A. Contract   
A. 1 Consent and Patient Information Brochure.  X’s relationship with the Biobank is, 
primarily, governed by contract. She participates in the Biobank on the basis of her 
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informed consent. Her consent is based upon the information she has received from 
the Biobank: the Participant Information Brochure (PIB). Collectively, the consent 
document signed by X and the PIB set forth the contractual terms and conditions of 
her participation. A core provision of the contract is X’s right to discontinue her 
participation and to withdraw her consent. X admits that she has the right to withdraw 
at any time. But her point is that her right to withdraw entails the right to be informed 
on any relevant personal findings so she can make an informed decision whether she 
has reason to withdraw. Her willingness to continue to participate might be affected 
by significant new findings developed during the course of the research. The 
implications of these findings for an individual, no matter how qualified and limited 
in terms of analytical validity and clinical utility, may lead her to reconsider her initial 
consent and to withdraw from the study.16,17 She can only effectively use her right to 
withdraw if she receives disclosure of the Biobank’s findings. 
 
A.2 Raised expectations. X also claims that the Biobank raised her expectation that 
she would receive information pertaining to her personal health. According to the 
PIB, the study aims to link abstract genomic data with concrete patient medical 
records, to generate large amounts of data to accurately describe patients and to bring 
about the era of personalised medicine. These objectives were a major incentive for X 
to participate in the study and part of the contract. As the Biobank could have known 
that a primary reason for participants to participate in genetic studies is their wish to 
find out about their own health, not disclosing pertinent health information amounts to 
a breach of contract.   
B. Invalidity of Non-Disclosure policy 
B.1 Non-disclosure policy obsolete. The traditional policy of non-disclosure rests on a 
number of considerations, which include, but are not limited to, (i) the fact that most 
research findings in epidemiology or cohort studies are aggregate findings of an 
exploratory nature, with little or no analytical validity or clinical utility for the 
individual concerned, (ii) the costs, competence and complexity involved in proper 
reporting to individuals and (iii) the fact that these findings ordinarily cannot be 
linked to identifiable participants.18  Also, the policy is based on the traditional 
concept of hypothesis-driven research. For this type of research, the chances of 
making incidental findings, i.e. findings discovered in the course of conducting the 
research but beyond the aims of the study, were considered to be minimal. Traditional 
disclosure policies are based on the recommendation that the research must be 
designed so as to minimize the chances of an incidental finding. 19 X argues that the 
above rationale has become obsolete, in view of the nature of Biobank research 
developments in technology, medicine and society.  
 
B.1.1 Nature of Biobank research. Unlike most traditional studies, the Biobank is 
designed to form a resource that will enable the conduct of not just one, but hundreds 
of different research projects into all kinds of diseases, some of which have yet to be 
formulated, by a host of multidisciplinary research teams, rather than focusing on a 
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specific disease.20 It is expected to identify risk factors related to more than one 
disease and the occurrence of various diseases within one individual.21 The Biobank 
is set up to facilitate large-scale genomic epidemiology pursued as “discovery 
research”. In such research any genomic pattern correlating with pathology may be 
captured and studied.22 Finally, the Biobank researchers have the ability to link 
research findings to individual research participants and, in many cases, to 













late its findings into personal health information for the individual 
participant. 
 
B.1.2 Technological and scientific developments. X further points to a number of new
high-throughput technologies used by the Biobank which are capable of generating 
large amounts of information at low cost and high speed.24 In addition, Genome Wide 
Association Studies (GWAS)25 permit interrogation of the entire human genome at
levels of resolution previously unattainable, in thousands of unrelated individuals, 
unconstrained by prior hypotheses regarding genetic associations with disease.26,27 
Even if their purpose is not to provide results about individual participants, the
may generate such results, ranging on a continuum from clinically significant 
information to information relevant to ancestry and genealogy, to information that is 
merely of recreational interest.28 Every time a GWAS is conducted, the researcher 
the opportunity to look in each individual’s DNA, not only for data that correlates 
with the disorder b
o
 
B.1.3 ‘Translational’ developments. One of the rationales of traditional non-disclos
policies is that the interpretation and application of scientific findings in the clinic 
requires a chain of evidence, the goal being to translate findings from “PubMed to 
patient”. It involves replication, randomized clinical trials, professional consensus 
building, the adoption of protocols, and the establishment of analytical validity an
clinical utility. The ultimate use of the information in the clinic is controlled and 
limited by the physician as the traditional gatekeeper of the healthcare infrastructure. 
This traditional chain of translation has been challenged by the emergence of person
genomics services. Personal genomics companies 30,31,32  claim to be able to bri
the gap between peer-reviewed and published findings on the one hand and the 
individual, or at least, his genotype, on the other.33,34 Using scientific, publi
knowledge, they analyze samples collected at home, to discover individual 
predispositions for a variety of common conditions. 35,36,37 X argues that if these 
companies can translate the scientific literature into personal health information in a 
matter of weeks, then the Biobank could do the same for her, and more. After all, it is 
the Biobank that is the primary producer of such findings. On top of that, the Biobank 
has superior, long-term access to all relevant phenotype data, stored in a standardized
way, to help trans
C. Negligence  
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
  2008  2009, Vol.5, No.1, pp.55-79 
 
 
_____________       
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.1 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© ESRC Genomics Network. 
 
62
The third argument advanced by X is an action for negligence. For a negligence 
lawsuit to succeed under Dutch civil law, X must establish that the refusal by the 
Biobank to feed back findings, intended or incidental, to X either infringes upon her 
personal rights (C.1 Personal rights), or breaches a statutory obligation (C.2 Statutory 
claims the following personal rights: 
e right to know health information; the right to know research results; the right to 
 
rotection 




e, on request. Notably, this 




ge. X argues 
obligation), or violates a generally accepted standard of care (C.3 Standard of care).  
 
C.1 Non-disclosure infringes personal rights.  X 
th
benefit; the right to life; and the right to health.  
 
C.1.1 Right to know health information. X asserts that she has a right to know health
information.  She refers to the Convention of the Council of Europe for the P
of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the application of 
Biology and Medicine.38 This convention covers all medical and biological 
applications concerning human beings, including research applications.39 Pursuant to 
article 10 everyone is entitled to “know” any information collected about his or her 
health. According to the Explanatory Report, a person's "right to know" encompasses 
all information collected about his or her health, whether it be a diagnosis, prognosis 
or “any other relevant fact”.40 In addition, Article 13 of the Additional Proto
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that, before being ask
consent to participate in a research project, “the persons concerned shall be 
specifically informed, according to the nature and purpose of the research, of 
arrangements for access to information relevant to the participant arising from the 
research and to its overall results”. The protocol further provides that research 
participants shall be entitled to know “any information collected on their health”
conformity with the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention. If research gives ri
to “information of relevance” to the current or future health or quality of life of 
research participants, this information must be offered to them. That is to be done 
within a framework of health care or counselling. As to the availability of results, 
Article 28 of the Additional Protocol provides that the conclusions of the research 
shall be made available to participants in reasonable tim
ri
information on risks which are treatable or actionable. 
 
C.1.2 Right to benefit. X refers to a series of international instruments in the area o
biomedical research that all call for benefit sharing. For example, the Internation
Declaration on Human Genetic Data,41 which specifically applies to biobanking,
requires that the benefits resulting from the research on the data be shared with 
society as a whole. And Article 3 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights42 provides that, in advancing scientific knowledge, direct and indirect 
benefits to patients, research participants and other affected individuals should be 
maximized. In giving effect to the principle of benefit-sharing, benefits may take the 
form of special assistance to the persons participating in the research, provision of 
new diagnostics stemming from research, or access to scientific knowled
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that her participation in the Biobank amounts to a significant contribution. In addition 
to providing, biennially, blood and urine samples, she frequently fills in 
questionnaires, answers detailed questions about her education, employment, phys
activity, nutrition habits, general health condition etc. She has also allowed the 
Biobank access to her health records and other records th
ical 
at may be related to her 





he Biobank to take measures to avoid any risk, not just genetic 
sks, as the Biobank has or ought to have superior knowledge and access to all 
 
e 
lure by the Biobank to disclose “essential information that would 
enable her to assess the risks she and her family might run” constitutes a violation of 





full disclosure of any findings pertinent to her health.43  
 
C.1. 3 Right to life. X also invokes her right to life, laid down in Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 44 As well as a negative obligatio
not to take anyone’s life, this right imposes a positive obligation on the state and 
public authorities to protect the right to life.45 Applying the Convention to the non-
disclosure policy of UK Biobank, Johnson and Kaye have argued that Article 2 of
ECHR could impose a positive obligation on UK Biobank to put in place measures to 
avoid a risk to the lives of the participants.46 More specifically, citing the Osman 
case47 they argue that this positive obligation entails the provision of feedback of risk 
of a serious genetic disease, if this is revealed during the course of the researc
project.48 In Osman, the ECHR noted that Article 2 of the Convention might, in wel
defined circumstances, imply a positive obligation on the authorities to take 
preventive measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal 
acts of another individual. X takes this a step further and asserts that she can 
reasonably expect t
ri
relevant records.   
 
C.1. 4 Right to health. Next, X invokes her right to health. Failure to protect a 
person’s health may amount to a breach of the right to respect for one’s private life, 
set forth in Article 8 of the ECHR.49 ‘Private life’ includes not merely a right to 
control personal information, but also protection of privacy interests in physical and
moral integrity.50,51 The right imposes both negative and positive obligations on th
state, including a right to have assistance in the fulfilment and enjoyment of one’s 
private life.52 X argues that Article 8 also applies to the Biobank as a semi-public 
institution, so that fai
her right to health.53 
C.2 Non-disclosure violates statutory obligations 
 
X
number of statutory obligations. 
 
C.2.1 Clinical trials. X analogizes her situation with that of human subjects in clinical
trials, who are protected by the Dutch Act on Medical Scientific Research involv
Human Subjects. The Act provides that participants in clinical research enjoy certa
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information rights during the trial. Specifically, in the event the trial has serious 
events that turn out to be more adverse than foreseen in the research protocol, the 
investigator must immediately notify the trial subject. In addition, Article 10 of the 






n combine with access to her health records, family history and 
life-style data. X argues, therefore, that the Biobank setting crosses the line between 
Biobank, this 
ort 
 Review of 









course of the trial”.   
 
C.2.2 Right to know medical record. As a patient, X has a statutory right to kn
the health information kept by her treating physician in her medical record. That 
would include information about diagnosis, test results, prognosis, risks and 
treatment.54 According to X, this right should be extended to health information 
generated in the context of the Biobank for the following reasons. First, the Biobank
has been established by and forms an integral part of a series of academic hospit
From X’s perspective, the Biobank is an extension of the healthcare infrastructure. 
Second, X’s donations of blood and urine and physical examinations qualify as
medical examinations. Third, the Biobank research on her samples and data is not an
isolated and incidental affair, performed in a remote university lab. Rather, all 
measurements and findings have added to an integrated and comprehensive dataset 
that the Biobank ca
research and care. 
C.3 Negligence: Breach of generally accepted standard of care 
It has been argued that researchers have a duty of ancillary care to subjects of 
research, based on the principle that, by participating in (clinical) research, 
participants entrust their health to the researchers.55 In the context of the 
duty encompasses the duty to feed back findings to individual participants. In supp
of this claim, X cites the International Guidelines for Ethical
E
Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 56 and international precedent.  
 
C.3.1 CIOMS Guidelines. The CIOMS Guidelines apply to epidemiological studie
They are based on the four basic ethical principles governing all research involving 
human subjects: respect for persons, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.57
Respect for persons incorporates autonomy, which requires that those who are cap
of deliberation about their personal goals should be treated with respect for their 
capacity for self-determination. Beneficence is the ethical obligation to maximize 
possible benefits and to minimize possible harms and wrongs.58 Non-maleficen
("Do no harm") holds a central position in the tradition of medical ethics, and gu
against avoidable harm to research subjects. The principle of justice is mainl
concerned with the rules of distributive justice: the class of persons bearing the 
burden should receive an appropriate benefit.  The preamble to the CIOMS 
Guidelines provides that part of the benefit that communities, groups and individuals 
may reasonably expect from participating in studies is that they will be told o
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findings that pertain to their health.59 In informing individuals of the findings and 
their pertinence to health, their level of literacy and comprehension must be 
considered. Research protocols should include provision for communicating such 
information to communities and individuals.60 In addition, research findings and 
advice to communities should be publicized by whatever suitable means are available.











 the Gene Bank, except for their genealogies, for free. In addition, the 










should be advised of means of obtaining personal diagnosis and advice.  
 
C.3.2 Disclosure of findings is supported by international precedent. X refers to the 
Estonian Genebank, a project similar to the Biobank. The Estonian Genebank is 
national Gene Bank consisting of tissue samples, descriptions of DNA, descriptions o
state of health and genealogies of the Estonian population. The objective of 
Estonian Genebank is twofold:  to enable gene and health research to find genes tha
influence the development of illnesses and to provide a gene donor with an 
opportunity to assess his or her health risks and diagnose illnesses more precisely, 
prevent illness and receive more effective treatment in the future.62 Gene donor





The Framingham Heart Study. In 1948, at a time that the administrators in the 
Tuskegee study should have realized that an effective medicine had become availabl
for their subjects, the US Public Health Service initiated what is considered the 
‘mother of all biobanks’, the Framingham Heart Study.64 The study was to look f
the root causes of cardiovascular diseases (CVD), which had become an Am
epidemic.65 The project was designed to study the expression of coronary artery
disease in a “normal” or unselected population and to determine the factors 
predisposing to the development of the disease through clinical and laboratory 
examinations and long-term follow-up of such a group.66 The researchers recruited 
5,209 men and women between the ages of 30 and 62 from the town of Framingham, 
Massachusetts. With time, they found suggestive links between high blood pressure 
and heart disease, between tobacco use and heart disease, and between elevated leve
of blood cholesterol and heart disease.67 The researchers wanted everyone to have t
information they had on the risk factors for heart disease. Reportedly, at times they 
wanted to shout from the rooftops: “Quit smoking”, or “Lose weight”. But all they 
would say was “See your physician”.68 This policy of non-disclosure rested on two
premises. First, the objective of the study was to be a long-term observational stud
healthy people, not to be a public health program. Before the physicians could do 
anything about heart disease, they had to wait for others to transform the Study’s 
findings into treatments and preventive measures.69  Second, the local doctors of 
Framingham were worried that the Heart Study was the first step toward federal 
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intrusion into their practice - they wanted to be sure that they would not lose their 
patients to the Study’s doctors. To maintain the trust of local physicians, the Study’s 
researchers would not treat or even offer advice to the participants they were seeing. 
The only way to let the volunteers’ physicians, and all physicians, know what advice
to give was to publish the results of their years of observation. These publications had
a powerful effect and laid the groundwork for translating medical research from the 





obesity, diabetes, and physical inactivity.  The accomplishments have been listed 
ents of the twentieth century.72  
70 Over the years, 
careful monitoring of the Framingham Study population has led to the identification
of the major CVD risk factors - high blood pressure, high blood cholestero
71
among cardiology’s 10 greatest achievem
The Biobank’s brief 
The Biobank advances a number of legal defences. It claims that its contractual no
disclosure policy is clear (A. Clear contract) and its underlying rationale still valid (B. 
Rational policy). Next, it argues that that the personal rights invoked by X do not 
apply (C. No negligence). Finally, the Biobank counters that an obligati
n-
on to (offer to) 
disclose its findings would be at odds with a series of law and policy considerations 
ical and practical justifications for non-disclosure). 
ces in 
the 
ulation screening administrators and radiologists 
were sued for not reporting findings or reporting findings as ‘not suspect’, which later 
gn and fatal. 
 of clinical 
e 
t do not 
(D. Statutory, med
A. Clear contract 
The Biobank maintains that the PIB contains a clear explanation of the Biobank’s 
disclosure policy. By signing the consent form X has agreed to this policy, the terms 
of which are crystal clear and not in need of further interpretation. The referen
the PIB to personalised medicine are generic descriptions of the ultimate goal of 
bank. They cannot reasonably be construed so as to confer on participants an 
enforceable right to receive personalised feedback on Biobank findings. Similar 
limitations on the disclosure of findings have been upheld by the courts in the context 
of population screening, when pop
turned out to be mali
B. Rational Policy   
The rationale for the non-disclosure policy is still valid. Statutory standards
care would require any feedback to be analytically valid, clinically valid and hav
clinical utility.73 74 The assessment of analytical validity would require the 
performance of independent confirmatory testing. Clinical validity refers to the 
quality and quantity of empirical evidence regarding the association between a 
genotype and a particular clinical outcome.75 The interpretation of associations 
reported by research on the Biobank requires a chain of evidence substantiating the 
validity of the association found in a single initial study. 76 77 78 Results tha
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meet this basic prerequisite simply do not constitute “information” and the Biobank 
cannot reasonably be held to an obligation to provide “non-information”.  
 
. No negligence 




s that screening for serious late-onset diseases for which 
ere is no treatment should remain exceptional, even when screening is related to 




rovide that subjects of epidemiological studies 
C
C.1 No breach of personal rights. 
 
C.1.1 International declarations are not binding. The international declarations 
invoked by X are either non-binding or non-enforceable, as they have not been 
ra
implementation at the national level, the instruments cannot be used to construe
enforceable obligations on the part of the Biobank in a private cause of action. 
 
C.1.2 International declarations do not apply to observational research. Most 
international instruments invoked by X do not apply to the Biobank anyway, as th
apply to interventional or clinical research rather than the observational research 
pursued by the Biobank. Admittedly, the Council of Europe Recomm
on research on biological materials of human origin does apply to research using 
biological materials kept in population biobanks. However, it does not contain a 
provision on disclosure of the results from this type of research. The 
Recommendation even puts severe limitations on the type of screening to be done in 
such biobanks. It stipulate
th
scientific research, as it would put too much strain on the free participation an
privacy of individuals.79 
 
C.1.3 International guidelines limit reporting obligations. The international 
instruments and declarations invoked by X do not provide for an unconditional 
obligation on the part of scientists to feed back findings to individual participants. 
Article 10 of the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data explicitly provides
that it does not apply to research on data for which links to identifiable persons are 
irretrievably broken or to data that do not lead to individual findings concerning
persons who have participated in such a research. The CIOMS Guidelines allow that 
an ethics committee may approve the non-disclosure of the data for a stated reason 
that will, itself, be given to the participant. Such reasons could include: lack of 
relevance of data, limitations of predictive capability of research data, concerns of 
misinterpretation by the participant, absence of ‘good clinical practices’ standards
exploratory research or lack of feasibility (e.g., data are anonymised). Also, the duty 
to inform research subjects of any finding that relates to their particular ‘health status’ 
at the end of the study is open to wide interpretation – it is not clear that it would 
include most polygenic determinants of disease susceptibility, even if they had been 
validated. 80 The CIOMS Guidelines p
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involved in a series of (alleged) criminal confrontations over a couple of years, the 
ithout extensive translation, decoding and 




rm subjects of trial 
ata. Indeed, Renegar et al have concluded that there appears to be no definitive 
ce 
 
t to know his medical records and any 
corresponding obligations for healthcare providers, such as the duty to disclose to 
ed in the course of diagnosis, prognosis and 
erapy, do not apply to the Biobank setting. 
pertain to their health, but that they should not take this to mean that they are fre
the disease or condition under study. 
 
C.1.4 No violation of the right to life and health. The European Convention on 
Human Rights is directed at states. It does not impose positive or negative obligations 
on “non-state” entities such as the Biobank. In the Osman case cited by X, the 
European Court of Human Rights made it clear that any positive obligations for the 
State (to safeguard lives or to protect private and family life) must be interpreted in 
manner that does not pose an impossible or disproportionate burden, bearing in mind 
the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human 
conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and 
resources. For the Court not every claimed risk to life could entail for the national 
authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that ri
from materializing.81 Osman, furthermore, is clearly distinguishable from the B
scenario at hand. Unlike Osman, which involved specific, acquainted individuals 
Biobank cannot reasonably know, w
in
C.2 No violation of statutory rights 
 
C.2.1 No right to know research results. No such right exists, the Biobank claims, a
regards the outcome of scientific, non-interventionist studies. In fact, such a right does
not even exist as regards the outcome of interventional research, i.e. clinical 
The Dutch Medical Research on Human Subjects Act,82 which implements the EC 
Directive on Clinical Trials, does not contain an obligation to inform subjects of trial 
data of any nature. Notably, neither the EC Clinical Trial Directive, nor the 
International Conference on Harmonisation of Good Clinical Practices (ICH-GCP) 
nor even the Declaration of Helsinki contains an obligation to info
d
requirement in relevant laws and regulations in the US or the EU that research results 
have to be, in all circumstances, returned to study participants.83  
 
C.2.2 Right to know medical record does not apply. The Biobank operates a resour
for scientific research. It is not a healthcare provider and its participants are not its
patients. Hence, the statutory right of a patien
patients all health information collect
th
C.3 No violation of standard of care 
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C.3.1. No conflation of care and research. X wrongly implies that standards for 
clinical practice and clinical research can be extended to observational research. The
goal of clinical practice is improvement of the individual health of patients. In 
contrast, the goal of research is development of generalizable knowledge for the 









etween participants and the Biobank as entrustment or bailment is the fact that the 





etting. Instead, it will be held to 
84 Much effort has been spent in making a clear 
delineation between the role of the researcher and the role of the treating physician, 
because of the conflict of interest that the dual roles present.85 Imposing an obligat
on the Biobank to (offer to) feed back findings to individuals would reinforce the 
‘therapeutic misconception’ held by participants and sometimes also by researchers.  
Some have even proposed a  ban for treating physicians to do research on their 
patients.86 From the researcher perspective too, blurring the lines between clinical 
research and research obligations should be undertaken only for compelling reasons, 
based on accurate information and clear informed consent.87  
C.3.1.2 Ancillary care and bailment analogy does not apply. The Biobank further 
argues that no duty of ancillary care can be based on the theory of ‘entrustment’. Su
a duty is grounded in the vulnerability and dependency of participants.88 Howev
participation in the Biobank does not render the participants ‘vulnerable’. Most of 
them are not patients, but healthy volunteers. And if they become patients during the 
course of their participation, they will be treated outside the Biobank setting, in an 
ordinary clinical care setting. Likewise, the participants in the Biobank are not 
dependent on the Biobank. They can withdraw from the Biobank at any time. The 
Biobank does not offer them anything they need to maintain their health, to cure their 
disease or to take informed reproductive decisions. To fulfill these needs, they are 
dependent on their GP or specialist healthcare professional, not on the Biobank. 
Likewise, the legal theory described in the law concerning bailment does not hold in 
the context of the Biobank. The Biobank is not a bailee. It is not offering a service o
any kind. It is not a depository where people can store their samples and data and 
have them returned or fixed. The Biobank has not undertaken to heal, cure or care fo
any participant. It is a research facility where people can donate samples and data fo
future research. Another vital element belying the classification of the relationship 
b
participants are not being charged. If the Biobank were to be seen as a professional 
bailee of some sort, with ancillary duties on top of its obligations as a bailee, then, 
under Dutch law, it would have a statutory right to compensation for its service 89
 
C.3.1.3 Case law on standard of care. It follows from a number of Dutch court case
that clinicians performing population screening are not held to a standard of clinical 
care, but to a standard akin to that applied to reasonably acting and reasonably 
competent “screening” radiologists in “similar circumstances”.90 Whether the 
standard has been breached has to be determined by an expert witness, taking i
account the population screening in its original context. Applying this standard to the
Biobank situation, it is clear that the Biobank will not be held to the standard o
individual medical professional acting in a clinical s
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information.  The current consent form for the Framingham Heart Study provides 
rformed upon 
sts may be developed as a result of the 
m Heart Study.95  
 
 






standard is even lower than the standard for population screening, as the Biobank is 
not intended to find high or low classes of at-risk individuals, but to carry out
research, and as the researchers are not clinicians.  
 
C.3.2 Foreign examples. The Biobank’s policy of non-disclosure is further supported 
by a number of similar policies of similar biobanks in other countries. In the 
Singapore Tissue Network, neither donor nor doctor will receive the results of 
research carried out using donated samples.91 The UK Biobank will not provide 
individual feedback to participants of results obtained through the research proces
any reason.92 Participants in the Canadian biobank CartaGene will not re
individual research results, unless they have opted to receive a document containing
the measurements taken during the enrolment visit.93 Generation Scotland will give
participants health information on some important clinical measurements such as 
blood pressure, cholesterol and kidney function, but no personal g
94
that participants will not be informed of the results of the research pe
their genetic blood sample, although genetic te
combined analysis of samples in the Framingha
D. Statutory, medical and practical justifications for non disclosure 
D.1 Statutory justifications for non-disclosure 
D.1.1 Compliance with domestic law. Any offer to disclose any findings must be 
compliant with domestic law. This truism was reiterated by the European Court of
Human Rights in Osman, where the Court considered as a relevant factor the need to 
ensure that the police exercised their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner
w
restraints on the scope of their action” to investigate crime and bring offenders to 
justice. Applied to biobanks, any obligation to feed back results and findings, in
any obligation to warn, is always subject to statutory, legitimately placed restraints.  
 
D.1.2. Protection of the public against false alarm/assurances. According to the 
Biobank, meeting X’s request for health information in compliance with these 
statutory restraints is not feasible. The provision of medical or health information by 
public- and private-sector parties to populations, subpopulations and individuals, both
healthy and affected, is governed by a host of sometimes conflicting statutes an
directives. The thrust of these consumer and patient protection regulations is to 
protect the general public against “false alarms”, “non-actionable alarms” and “false 
reassurances”. To that end, these regulations prohibit or condition the generation a
provision of health information. The thrust of these conditions is that both the 
information and the way it is offered and presented must meet certain standards. 
These standards range from technical requirements for the devices used in generating
the information96 to a prior demonstration of a positive outcome of a cost-benefit 
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assessment of the offer of the information.97 There is no reason why such protection 
would not extend to the information generated in the Biobank context. The Biobank 
cannot be obliged to provide or to offer to provide information that otherwise would 
not pass statutory standards in similar or analogous settings. A substantial part of the 
s unlikely to meet these 
andards. Put briefly, as national and international regulators step up efforts to curtail 








ical competence  and professional clinical qualifications , 









information generated by the research on the Biobank’s data i
st
the offer of health risk information,98 the Biobank cannot be obliged to lower the bar. 
 D.2  Medical and practical justifications for non disclosure 
 
P
majeure’, i.e. circumstances which justify an otherwise actionable act or failure to act. 
The Biobank advances the following justifications: complexity, costs and consent to 
know. 
 
D.2.1 Complexity and (in)competence. The broad array of new genome-scale tests ha
led to the discovery of multiple abnormal or ‘unexpected findings’, analogous to th
‘incidentalomas’ that are often discovered in radiological studies.99 The application of 
comprehensive genotype and functional genomic measurements across the genera
population is likely to yield incidental findings for nearly everyone. Any large-scale
genomic panel is therefore likely routinely to report false-positive results. Even if 
genomic tests were to achieve 100% sensitivity and a false-positive rate of 0, th
of the incidentalome remain and will lead to iatrophic pathology, i.e. aggressive
diagnostic and therapeutic investigations in an otherwise healthy individual.100 The
consequences of an incidentalome for Biobank researchers are obvious. To oblige 
them to look beyond the variables under study to findings of potential clinical 
significance for individual participants would place on them a disproportionate 
burden. Lacking clin 101 102
B
genomic measures. As even regular healthcare providers lack training and ex
the interpretation of genetic research results,103 X might be subjected to unnecessary 
follow-up tests.104  
 
D.2.2  Costs.  Even the most ardent proponent of a reporting obligation has 
acknowledged that the disclosure of results has economic implications for research
in planning their budgets and for funding agencies in determining an appropriate level
an duration of funding.105 Or, as another ‘full disclosure’ proponent put it: “The 
problem, of course, is money”.106 The consequence of requiring researchers to bu
for managing incidental findings is “in the present financial climate ...that half a
much research gets done, and that has, in my mind, a much greater impact on societ
than the very, very low incidence of incidental findings which are actually correct and
an even lower incidence where there is something you could have done”.107 The 
setting in which Biobank results are generated typically lacks the resources fo
additional research, replication of results and clinical counselling and follow-up of 
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individual participants. Costs will be increased by the requirement that the disclo





h him or her, is a 










blished findings (disclosure proponents claim it could also cover 
unpublished findings),111, then the Biobank would have to go back to 150,000 




ves a heterogeneous 
t of stakeholders, including not only the Biobank itself, but also third-party 
 
108 Notably, Article 7.1 of the recent Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that ‘a genetic test for healt
purposes may only be performed under individualized medical supervision’.109 
According to the explanatory report, ‘a precise evaluation of the situation of the 
person concerned, involving direct contact with a medical doctor wit
d
doctor, for example, does not allow for such evaluation’. This requirement of ‘live’ 
and individualized medical supervision is likely to impose a disproportionate b
on the Biobank, in view of the volume of findings and participants. 
 
D.2.3 Consent to know. All international legal instruments relied upon by X provide 
that the participants’ right not to know should always be respected. However, 
participants’ desire to know or not to know cannot be fixed at the outset, but will vary
according to their age, sex, offspring, education level, employment status, ethnicity, 
religion, health status and other factors. Their wishes will also vary according to t
disease concerned, probability of onset, and the (im)possibility of an intervention
Their wishes may also change over time, as participants grow sadder and wiser o
therapeutic or life-style modifications become possible. The wealth of findings and 
the infinite variety of participants’ desires to know or not to know these findings 
would make it practically unfeasible for the Biobank to meet the requirement o
obtaining participants’ prior informed consent to know. The Framingham Heart
Study, for example, has produced more than 1000 scientific papers since its inception
or some 20 papers per annum.110  If the Biobank reporting obligation were to be
limited to pu
individuals (or their GPs) 20 ti
be informed on the individual implications (positive or negative) of the finding 
concerned.  
Considerations of the court  
The outcome of the case is hard to predict. The above discussion has been limited to 
the threshold legal issue of whether participants have the right to receive (full) 
disclosure of pertinent health information. In practice, any liability of the Biob
this respect will depend on the circumstances of the case, procedural issues, sta
limitations, burden of proof, damages (loss of chance), and causation. Much will
depend on the actual configuration of the Biobank, which invol
se
researchers (academic and from industry). The Biobank is not necessarily in a 
position to secure relevant disclosures from these third parties. Subject to these
limitations, a Dutch civil law court might consider as follows. 
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In essence, this case pitches an intuitively appealing claim of lifelong participants in a
population biobank for disclosure of pertinent health information against the 
logically appealing notion that this biobank is not their doctor. The fate of the 
participants in the Tuskegee Experiment (a public health observational study of the 
natural course of untreated syphilis) reminds us of the imperative to inform research
participants that (i) they are the subjects of an investigation, (ii) whether
 
 
 or not they 
ctually suffer from the disease under investigation and (iii) whether an evidence-
er hand, the 
ccesses of another public health observational study, the Framingham Heart Study, 
on 
h in an academic-










in the analogous area of population screening suggests that a proper ‘non-disclosure 
a
based intervention is available to cure or prevent such disease. On the oth
su
are a reminder that observational research should focus on observation, validati
and publication rather than direct translation into clinical application.  
 
The arguments to be made on either side can be summarized as follows.  
 
According to X the following arguments support her claim for full disclosure of 
pertinent health information: the (contractual) terms of her participation; the 
characteristics of the Biobank research; its stated purpose of linking abstract 
genomic data and concrete patients records; the expectations it raised of delivering 
personalised medicine; the embedding of the Biobank researc
c
technology, science and society; her (international human) rights to know health 
information, the right to know clinical research results, her right to life and to health; 
and, last but not least, her significant, lifetime contribution to the Biobank of a weal
of detailed and sensitive samples and data (right to benefit).  
 
According to the Biobank  the following arguments speak against (full) disclosure: th
unambiguous language of its policy of non-disclosure and the rationale behind 
lack of analytical validity and/or clinical utility of most findings; the need to avoi
conflation of research and care; the inappropriateness of applying 
d
(statutory) competence to provide health information to individuals; the complexity 
and costs associated with reporting a potentially endless number of sometimes 
conflicting findings; and the disproportionate burden resulting from the need to 
respect the right not to know before any disclosure can be made.   
 
It goes without saying that the legal duty to warn of imminent dangers implies that
more the requested data pose a real, imminent and actionable risk to X, the more 
likely it is that a reporting obligation on the part of the Biobank will be found. Also, 
the more the Biobank has raised the level of feedback expectations, the more likely it 
is that it will be required to meet those expectations. However, the terms of the non-
disclosure policy at hand are indeed unambiguous. The Biobank may have rai
some expectations, but the references to personalised medicine are too global to 
uphold a claim for disclosure of findings at the individual participant level. Case law
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policy’ will be upheld. The case law also suggests that the Biobank is unlikely t
held to a clinical standard of care or
o be 
 even a standard of ‘semi-clinical’ care. 
articipants in the Biobank should and could have realized that the Biobank is not 
 face 
rend in 
 soft law 
Unlike 
nd to 
fer to evidence-based interventions. This is also true for information 
earing on reproductive choices, for which X could turn to regular counsellors. In 
re 
. 
Databases (which recommend that biobanks should elaborate an adequate 




and cannot be their (collective) doctor. Rather, the standard of care of the Biobank 
must be determined in the proper context, i.e. the research context, taking into 
account all relevant circumstances. 
 
As evidence of the predictive value of genetic variants accrues, investigators may
growing pressure to report findings that have an influence on risk.112 113 Some 
commentaries maintain that participants are even entitled to receive provisional 
results, with an explanation of the limitations of the data.114 Concurrently, a t
international legal instruments towards the recognition of a right to feedback of 
research results has been reported in ethical and legal commentaries. These
instruments and opinions could be taken into account when assessing the proper 
standard of care in a tort action for negligence. Closer examination of these 
instruments, however, reveals that, assuming they are binding and enforceable in a 
private cause of action, most of them relate to clinical research, not to non-
interventional research. Contrary to the situation in a clinical trial, X is neither 
vulnerable nor dependent on the Biobank. She can go to see her doctor at will. 
the Biobank, a doctor would be qualified and competent to make a diagnosis a
offer or re
b
addition, X could enrol in validated population screening programmes, which 
typically will be initiated or informed by validated findings of studies like the 
Biobank. 
 
The features of the observational Biobank findings further caution against the 
extension of these standards to population biobank research without appropriate 
adjustments: the sheer number of participants, the number of findings and the natu
of these findings, which are likely to include both ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’
Notably, the CIOMS Guidelines, one of the few instruments which does apply to 
observational research, allows for an ethical review committee to approve temporary 
or permanent non-disclosure of data in view of the scale of a particular study. In 
addition, the 2009 OECD Draft Guidelines on Human Biobanks and Genetic 
Research 
fe
research using a biobank’s materials and data should not be reported back to the
participants and that this should be explained to participants during the consent 
process.  
 
Under the present circumstances and based on the above considerations, we are 
reluctant to honour X’s demand to be offered full disclosure of the Biobank’s find
pertaining to her individual health. However, that is not to hold that the Biobank is 
not under an obligation to use best efforts to inform its participants, at the 
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appropriate community or sub-community level, of its findings and their implications 
for individual participants. Indeed, providing as much validated personal health 





f completed studies, a register of ongoing studies, webcasts, regular 
pdates of FAQs, and webchat sessions with designated investigators. In due course, 
lly 
ould be “quickly 
vailable for the prevention and cure of disease”.  The Biobank is neither X’s doctor 
nor her personal genomics company. However, as a collaborative research enterprise 
e bank must take care of her participants’ legitimate interest in receiving validated 







It has even been suggested that  disclosing to participants their own genotype
give them a personal stake in the ongoing research effort and could persuade them
continue to) participate in longitudinal research. 115  
 
As the Biobank acquires, over time, an increasingly enriched ‘picture’ of its 
participants, it would breach its duty of care owed to its participants if it failed to 
develop appropriate mechanisms to disclose pertinent health information to th
appropriate community of participants. There is no reason to limit this feedback to 
genetic information regarding rare disorders that are life-threatening and for wh
clinical treatments exist. Any such mechanism should fit the type, the urgency, the 
context, the limitations and the validity and utility of the information to be so 
provided. Such mechanisms could include a website, a participants’ forum, regular 
meetings and newsletters updating and summarizing recent findings, accessible 
bibliographies o
u
the Biobank should consider the provision to participants of a web-based, persona
controlled health record empowering them to access and use any data generated by 
the Biobank.116 
 
In brief, as the Biobank seeks “to track to their sources the causes of disease”, it 
should take note of its own stated ambition that research findings sh
a
th
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